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Abstract
Levels of interest rates below historical norms may have enhanced nan-
cial instability in developed and developing economies during the 2000's. The
risk taking channel of monetary policy transmission is a recent theory that
explains the interaction between risk perceptions of the nancial system and
monetary policy. This paper presents empirical evidence of the risk tak-
ing channel of monetary policy using detailed information on consumer and
commercial loans from the Colombian banking system. Using probit and du-
ration models we nd that the banking system takes on more risk when the
level of interest rates are too low. We also nd that the response to interest
rates is higher in the case of commercial loans.
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Recent global nancial crises strengthened the need for a better under-
standing of the link between the monetary policy and the nancial system.
Levels of interest rates below historical norms and lack of regulation may
have enhanced nancial instability, which has motivated some recent devel-
opments in monetary policy theory. One of these developments is the risk
taking channel in the transmission of monetary policy, based on work by
Borio and Zhu (2008), Disyatat (2010), Adrian and Shin (2009a) and others.
Particular emphasis has been placed on how policy actions impact risk per-
ceptions and attitudes of banks and other nancial institutions, leading to
shifts in the supply of credit. The main hypothesis of this monetary policy
transmission mechanism is that when interest rates are too low, the search
for yield induces nancial intermediaries to take on more risk by investing
in riskier assets. In addition, according to this channel, monetary policy
transmission can be reinforced by two aspects: variations in the health of
nancial intermediaries in terms of leverage and asset quality, and variations
in perception of risk and willingness to bear risk.
In a recent paper L opez et al. (2011) found evidence of the existence of
the risk taking channel of monetary policy in the case of Colombia. In that
study the authors use data for over 2 million commercial loans. The focus on
commercial loans is crucial given that the proportion of commercial loans on
total loans is about 50% in Colombia. Nonetheless, the behavior of consumer
loans seems to be not only more sensitive to the monetary policy rate but
they also represent a large proportion of total loans, 25%. Our interest in
this paper is twofold. First we investigate if there is a risk taking behavior of
banks in Colombia when they grant loans to households. Second, we compare
the incidence of the risk taking channel in commercial and consumer loans.
The paper is organized as follows. The rst section is this brief introduc-
tion. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework of the risk-taking channel
of monetary policy and overviews the empirical evidence. Section 3 describes
the empirical strategy of the paper. Section 4 summarizes the timing and
description of variables. Section 5 presents the main ndings of the empiri-
cal work. Section 6 presents the comparison of risk taking behavior between
commercial and consumer loans. Lastly, the conclusions of the paper are
presented in Section 7.
22. The risk taking channel: theory and evidence
There are two important ways in which low levels of interest rates may
inuence risk taking. The rst is through search for yield. Nominal inter-
est rates that are low compared to historical norms may create incentives
for assets managers to take on more risk for contractual, behavioral or in-
stitutional reasons (for example to meet a target nominal return). "For
example, in 2003-04 many investors shifted from low-risk government bonds
into higher-yielding but riskier corporate and emerging market bonds. They
were seeking to meet the nominal returns they had been able to achieve when
interest rates were higher", Gambacorta (2009). In times when interest rates
are low, the search for yield is often associated with the expansion of invest-
ments into riskier assets and borrowers as downside risks are played down,
Disyatat (2010) .
The second way is through the variations in nancial health of nancial
institutions measured by asset quality and leverage. Borio and Zhu (2008)
have emphasized this aspect by pointing out that monetary policy may be
reinforced because it has an impact on the risk perceptions and the willing-
ness to bear risk. One avenue through which such eects may work is via
the impact of interest rates on nancial buers or the perceived vulnerabil-
ity of agents to future economic shocks, Disyatat (2010). A reduction in
the policy rate boosts asset and collateral values, which in turn can modify
bank estimates of probabilities of default, loss-given-default and volatilities.
Anticipation of higher economic activity may lower the risk of bankruptcy.
Regarding the empirical evidence, the literature is growing. A study by
Gambacorta (2009) nds evidence that, for a large sample of industrial coun-
tries, expected probability of default of banks was negatively related with
long periods of low levels of interest rates during the 2007-2008 US nancial
crisis. Altunbas et al. (2009a) analyze the link between short term interest
rates and expected default frequencies using data for 600 European and US
banks over the period 1999-2008. Similarly, Jimenez et al. (2009) provide
evidence that Spanish banks grant more risky loans and reduce lending stan-
dards at lower levels of short term interest rates. Ioannidou et al. (2009)
nd similar results in the case of Bolivia and for the case of Colombia, L opez
et al. (2010) also nd that low of interest rates are related to risk taking
behavior of banks.
33. Empirical strategy to assess credit risk-taking at the consumer
loans level
In order to test the existence of a risk-taking channel at the consumers
loans level we go over four aspects. First, we use a Supernanciera dataset
(the banking supervision agency in Colombia) recorded by each bank in the
341 form. Second, we dene a measure of credit risk. Third, we address some
steps that help us to identify supply of credit from its demand (using loan and
borrower characteristics/identity and interactions with bank characteristics).
Four, we dene a measure of the monetary policy stance.
3.1. The dataset on consumer bank loans
Consumer loans are discriminated into credit card loans, automobile loans
and "other". The proportion of loans dierent to credit card and automobiles
is 73% of total consumer loans and it is a more homogeneous group in terms of
maturity, amount and collateral (this kind of loans does not have collateral
requirements). Therefore we focus our analysis in this kind of loans. We
employ a stratied random sampling method to select a sample that consist
of 131,265 consumer loans (13% of population). The sample statistics are
expanded to the population in order to do the inference.
The dataset contains condential information at the loan level on each
loan granted by all banks operating in Colombia during the period 2000:T1-
2011.T2. We have borrower, bank and loan information. For each borrower
we identify the number of bank connections, the age of the borrower in his
nancial system and the credit history. For each loan we know default status,
amount, and maturity. For bank characteristics, we have size of the banks,
leverage level, non-performing loans and interbank position.
3.2. The credit risk measures
We use two approximations to credit risk-taking. First, we measure credit
risk-taking with ex ante borrower-level proxies. As a rst approximation, we
employ probit models to analyze whether a loan is granted to a borrower with
bad credit history (depending on default on another loan in the previous 6
months) or without credit history. However, even though low levels of interest
rates may lead to more lending to risky borrowers, this does not imply risk-
taking per se because the net-worth of the risky borrowers also improve.
Hence, in order to isolate the change in credit risk-taking, we employ
duration models that allow us to analyze the impact of interest rates on loans
4not only at origination but also during the life of the loan. In this case we can
measure the impact of short-term interest rates prior to origination on the
loan hazard rate, which is the probability that a loan defaults in a period of
time given that it did not default before. In addition, this possibility further
contributes to econometric identication. Certainly, when policy interest
rates are high at the origination of the loan it may lead to a lower risk-taking
behavior by banks (as its net worth is lower) but it also results in higher
risk-taking once the loan is outstanding given that the borrowers' net worth
is lower.
3.3. Supply and demand identication problem and steps to approach it
The rich information contained in the Supernanciera dataset allows us
to mitigate the identication problem that we face in the econometric esti-
mation. The identication problem consists in the diculty to isolate supply
from demand responses to changes in policy rates when the level of credit in
the economy adjusts to the new policy conditions. However, four dierent
steps allow us to conduct a proper identication.
First, lower short-term interest rates result in higher loan demand from
both risky and safe borrowers. Therefore, if the demand for loans from risky
borrowers is higher than the demand from safe borrowers, and if the banks
appetite for risk remains unaected, we would expect a tightening in lending
standards. Hence, controlling for lending standards, such as amount and
maturity of loans helps to mitigate the identication problem, Jimenez et al.
(2009).
Second, given that we have information on the identity of borrowers and
other borrower characteristics, it is possible to absorb the variations in the
risk of the set of borrowers over the monetary policy cycle.
Third, as in Jimenez et al. (2009), we see the extent to which the strength
of banks' balance sheet and moral hazard problems, proxied by bank size,
aects the sensitivity of their risk-taking behavior to monetary policy shocks.
Finally, we use the information on borrower credit history to obtain an
indicator that allows us to identify how the monetary shocks induce changes
in the allocation of banks' lending between risky and safe borrowers. Com-
parison of this indicator with the evolution of short term interest rates gives
us a good approximation of the risk taking behavior of banks.
53.4. The monetary policy stance
Causality between policy interest rates and credit risk-taking usually runs
in both directions. When the monetary authority systematically reacts to
credit market considerations, policy interest rates are not exogenous. How-
ever, for the sample period that we are analyzing, the monetary authority in
Colombia did not systematically react to credit-risk. Only during 2007 did
the central bank take some measures to deal with excessive credit growth.
Nonetheless, in order to have an exogenous measure of the stance of the
monetary policy, we adopt a measure proposed by Gambacorta (2009) which
is the deviation of the real interest rate from its natural level.
4. Timing and description of variables
A loan l by a bank b is granted to borrower j in quarter t. If T denotes
the time to maturity of the loan, default would occur in quarter t+T.
We present three complementary analysis. We use probit models to see
the extent to which the stance of monetary policy at the origination of a
loan (time t-1) explains the probability that borrowers with recent bad credit
history or no credit history are granted a loan at time t. The ratio of loans
granted to risky borrowers vis a vis safe borrowers given the monetary policy
stance strengthens identication. Duration models dierentiate the impact
of monetary policy at the origination of the loan (t-1) and during the life of
the loan (t+T-1).
The denitions and descriptive statistics of the dependent and indepen-
dent variables are presented in Table 1. As independent variable we use the
stance of monetary policy measured as the deviation of the real short-term
interest rate from its natural level. As controls we use variables related to
banks characteristics and variables that help us to absorb some demand fac-
tors. These control variables are linked to borrower and loan characteristics.
We also control for the business cycle represented by the growth rate of the
GDP.
Credit risk-taking may also vary across banks. For example, small banks
may have more appetite for risk and banks with higher own fund at stake
may take lower risk. Some bank characteristics included as control variables
for banks are SIZE (each bank total assets/ bank system total assets), OWN
FUNDS/TOTAL ASSETS (the amount of bank equity over total assets),
a measure of risk appetite measured by BANK NPLb-NPL (the dierence
6between the bank and banking system non-performing loans) and INTER-
BANK POSITION (which is bank net interbank lending).
Other valuable feature of our dataset is that it allows us to include bor-
rower and loan characteristics that help to disentangle supply and demand
eects as the composition of the pool of borrowers and loans may change
over time. The variable LN (1+NUMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS)
allows us to identify the number of bank connections of each borrower. The
variable LN(2+AGE AS BORROWER) measures the age of the borrower in
the nancial system. As loan characteristics we include the amount of the
loan, LN(SIZE OF THE LOAN) and maturity of the loans using dummies
for 1 to 2 years, 2 to 3 years, and 4 to 5 years, benchmark being short-term
loans from 0 months to 1 year.
5. Results
5.1. Discrete choice models
We start by analyzing the evidence provided by the probit models where
we link the loans to borrowers with recent bad credit history (dened as
a borrower that was in default in the six previous months the date he/she
obtained a loan) or no credit history to the interest rate at origination, period
t-1. We also include the control variables mentioned above. Results are
presented in Table 2.
The negative coecient on the interest rate constitutes one of our main
results. When interest rates are low, banks grant more loans to borrow-
ers with recent bad credit history (RBCH) and to borrowers with no credit
history (NCH). Controlling for variables related to bank behavior, borrower
characteristics and lending standards, it is possible to say that is very proba-
ble that the remaining variation in credit is due to supply eects. Moreover,
using our cross-section information, it is possible to perform a triple inter-
action between RBCH borrowers, interest rates and bank size, and establish
which banks will be more prone to take on risk.
In the case of the variables related to banks' characteristics our nd-
ings are the following. In column I of Table 2, the coecient on the variable
BANK SIZE, indicates that small banks grant more loans to riskier borrowers
than large banks. Banks with a higher ratio of OWN FUNDS to TOTAL AS-
SETS grant fewer loans to riskier borrowers and banks with non-performing
loans (NPL) above average persist in risky borrowing.
7With respect to the variables that absorb some of the variation in loans
due to increased demand, we have most of the expected results. Borrowers
that have many bank connections are likely to have been performing poorly
recently. Similarly, older borrowers in the nancial system are probable to
have been performed badly. With respect to adjustment in lending standards
in response to lower quality borrowers, the positive sign for the coecient on
LOAN SIZE indicates that when a risky borrower is granted a loan, banks
do not adjust their lending standards to smaller loans, thus taking more risk.
The adjustment to higher standards, however, seems to take the form of a
shorter maturity for loans to lower quality borrowers.
Finally, to further identify supply eects, we use cross-sectional variation
in bank characteristics in two triple interactions. First a triple interaction
between bank size, interest rate and borrower risk, and then a triple inter-
action between banks leverage, interest rate and borrowers risk. Columns I
and II in table 2 present the results. We nd that the positive coecient
on the interaction imply that when interest rates are low, small banks grant
more loans to riskier borrowers. That is, smaller banks react more strongly
to expansionary monetary policy in terms of risk taking as suggested by Dia-
mond and Rajan (2006). Similarly, model II in Table 2 shows that the same
applies to banks with higher leverage ratios.
This latter interaction points to an interesting policy implication. Table 3
illustrates the eect of dierent combinations of policy stance (policy rate 1%
above or below the natural rate) and leverage (10 or 50 for the variable OWN
FUNDS/TOTAL ASSETS) on the marginal probability that a bank grants
a loan to a risky borrower. The results suggest that policy rates above the
natural rate, combined with higher capital requirements for banks, greatly
contribute to prevent risk-taking behavior in credit markets.
5.2. Duration models.
Although the results from the discrete choice models suggest the existence
of a risk taking channel, it is necessary to take into account two fundamental
aspects of the lending activity. First, banks grant more loans to riskier
borrowers at lower policy rates because they perceive an improvement in
borrowers' balance sheets and therefore, a lower probability of defaults of
loans. Therefore, to establish if the banks have a higher risk appetite it is
necessary to determine if the individual loans have higher or lower probability
of default.
8Second, since average loan maturity may change over time, more risk-
taking would entail lending at longer maturities. Hence, we need to analyze
credit risk-taking employing duration models to assess how the hazard rate
is aected by monetary policy.
5.2.1. The hazard function
Following Jimenez et al. (2009), we analyze the time to default of the
individual bank loan, or "loan spell", as a measure of risk. A default event
occurs if three months after the date of maturity or the date of an interest
payment, the debt balance remains unpaid. The hazard rate eectively is a
per-period measure of credit risk-taking and has an intuitive interpretation as
the per-period probability of loan default provided the loan 'survives' up to
that period. We rely on a parametric Weibull specication to determine the
shape of the hazard function with respect to time. The Weibull distribution
allows for monotonically positive or negative duration dependence.
Because some loans may be subject to repayments, it is possible that we
cannot observe a default on these loans. Such a loan spells can be considered
right censored.
5.2.2. Duration models results
The results for duration models are reported in Table 4. Our main nd-
ings correspond to the rst two rows in the table. First, when interest rates
are low, the probability of default of new loans increases. The estimated
coecient on INTEREST RATEt in column I is -0.00215. Second, when
interest rates are low the probability of default of outstanding loans is lower.
The estimated coecient on INTEREST RATEt+T 1 in column I is 0.0179.
In this sense, it is necessary to highlight that the risk taking channel is a
medium-term process. In the short term the impact of lower interest rate is
to decrease the probability of default of outstanding loans, but in the medium
term, the number of riskier loans granted increases.
With respect to the variables that correspond to bank characteristics, the
results suggest that smaller banks, with lower own funds and non-performing
loans higher than the average have more risk appetite. This is an expected
behavior, as banks with more funds at stake are less willing to risk their
assets. Small banks that are more exposed to moral hazard problems have
higher probabilities of default.
The results for borrower characteristics are in line with the results in the
probit models and help to disentangle the supply eect. Borrowers with more
9bank connections exhibit higher probability of default and, as indicated by
probit models, banks grant more loans to these borrowers. Similarly, older
borrowers are riskier according to the duration model and the probability
that the banks grant more loans to borrowers with RBCH when they are old
in the nancial system is higher according to the probit models.
With respect to loan characteristics, which are related to lending stan-
dards, when there is higher demand for loans, the results are mixed. When
the amount of the loan is large, the probability of default increases and,
according to the probit models, the probability of granting loans to RBCH
borrower increase when the amount of the loan is large. This is evidence of
risk taking behavior. On the other hand, long-term loans are riskier then
short-term loans and, according to the probit models banks do adjust their
lending standards with this respect.
The probability of default of both new and outstanding loans is negatively
related to the growth rate of the GDP. This is an indication that a more
dynamic economic activity mitigates risk taking behavior of banks.
Finally, in columns II, III and IV in Table 4 we present the results of du-
ration models including interactions between interest rates and bank charac-
teristics. Theory suggests that banks' propensity to adjust credit risk-taking
in response to monetary policy conditions may depend upon bank size, liq-
uidity and non-performing loans. These interactions further contribute to
addressing identication problems, Jimenez et al. (2009).
Smaller banks not only take more credit risk but, when interest rate are
low, their appetite for risk increases. On the other hand, banks that rely
more on the interbank market take more risk. This behavior is reinforced
with the stance of monetary policy. Banks with a relative higher ratio of
non-performing loans seem to continue in their ways by granting loans with
higher hazard rates. Monetary policy, however, counteract this behavior.
5.3. Risk taking and the supply of loans to risky borrowers
Next, we present the evolution of the supply of loans to risky borrowers
relative to safe borrowers during the sample period (2002.T1-2011.T2). In
gure 1 we observe that during the period 2004-2006 the supply of loans
to risky borrowers relative to safe borrowers increased from 12% to 16%.
This happened after a long period of low interest rates. After 2007, when
the monetary policy stance was more restrictive, the risk-taking behavior of
banks seems to have decreased. This constitutes suggestive evidence that in
the case of consumer loans, banks' appetite for risk indeed moved according
10to the level of the short term interest rates. It is important to stress that
even though during 2011 consumer lending increased considerably, the risk
taking behavior of banks was similar to that observed in 2007. This may be
due to the fact that the short term interest rate was higher than the natural
rate until march of 2010.
6. Comparison between commercial and consumer loans
In order to be able to compare the results obtained by L opez et al. (2010)
for commercial loans, we reproduce here the duration analysis that was ob-
tained there, Table 5. Interestingly, the eect of an expansionary policy
stance on the probability of default of commercial and consumer loans is the
same: low interest rates increase this probability for new loans and decrease
it for those already granted. In addition to this, bank, loan and borrower
characteristics, the control variables in both exercises, also display similar
results. This means that whatever evidence there is of a risk-taking chan-
nel of monetary policy in Colombia applies to both types of lending. There
is, however, an important dierence of degree in their response to monetary
policy shocks. In gure 2 we present the corresponding hazard rates for com-
mercial and consumer loans for periods when the short term interest rate
was low and when it was above the natural rate of interest. The reaction
of the hazard rate to the level of interest rates is stronger in the case of the
commercial loans. As can be seen in Figures 2 and 3, consumer loans are less
responsive to the monetary policy stance.
7. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the growing empirical literature on the risk
taking channel of monetary policy. In particular, this is the rst paper that
investigates the evidence of this channel in the case of consumer loans. We
also compare our results with the evidence found for the case of commercial
loans in L opez et al. (2011) and we conclude that the response of commercial
loans to monetary policy rates is stronger than in the case of consumer loans.
We use the Supernanciera 347 form, a dataset that contains informa-
tion on commercial and consumer loans since 2002, and information on the
dierence between the policy interest rate and the natural rate of interest as
a measure of the stance of monetary policy.
11Controlling for bank, loan, borrower and macroeconomic characteristics,
we nd evidence that, prior to origination, lower short-term interest rates
induce banks to soften their lending standards and grant more loans to bor-
rowers with recent bad credit history or no credit history. We also analyze
an indicator that measures the ratio of the amount of loans granted to risky
borrowers to the amount granted to safe borrowers and nd that when in-
terest rates are low for a long period of time the indicator increases. More
importantly, we nd that, in these circumstances banks grant loans with a
higher hazard rate (default probability).
In the case of outstanding loans, prior to origination, lower interest rates
imply lower credit risk. When interest rates are low the default probability
of these loans is lower. Therefore the impact of monetary policy is dierent
for new and for outstanding loans.
This have an implication in the credit risk in the economy. At the be-
ginning, when the amount of outstanding loans is larger than the volume of
new loans, lower interest rates decrease credit risk. However, in the medium-
term, as new loans increase, an expansionary monetary policy leads to higher
credit risk.
In addition, bank size aects risk taking behavior. Small banks take on
more extra risk when interest rates are low. This may be due to the fact that
this banks face more moral hazard problems. We nd evidence that when
interest rates are low, small banks grant more loans to risky borrowers.
Finally, comparison between the hazard rates for consumer and for com-
mercial loans shows that when interest rates are low, the hazard rate of
commercial loans is signicantly steeper than the hazard for consumer loans.
The opposite happens in the case of high interest rates. This means that in
order to discourage risk taking behavior of banks in the case of the consumer
loans, a more aggressive monetary policy or more instruments are required
to achieve the goal.
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18Table 3: Marginal probabilities
i>i*=1per cent i<i*=-1 per cent
OWN FUNDS/TOTAL ASSETSb;t 1 =10 -0.1424 -0.1440
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20Table 5: Duration Models : Commercial loans




INTEREST RATEt 1 * BANK SIZEb;t 1 0.0036***
INTEREST RATEt 1* OWN FUNDSb;t 1 0.0006***
BANK SIZEb;t 1 -0.0237*** -0.0308*** -0.0235***
OWN FUNDS/TOTAL ASSETSb;t 1 -0.0226*** -0.0225*** -0.0252***
INTERBANK POSITION /TOTAL ASSETSb;t 1 0.0192*** 0.0200*** 0.0199***
BANK NPLb;t 1- NPLt 1 0.0056*** 0.0053*** 0.0054***
BORROWER RISKt 1 (0/1) 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
LN (2+AGE AS BORROWERt 1 0.0409*** 0.0383*** 0.0373***
LN (SIZE OF THE LOANl;t 1 -0.0112*** -0.0109*** -0.0114***
COLLATERALlI (0/1) 0.3422*** 0.3440*** 0.3429***
MATURITYl 0m.-3m. (0/1) -1.0141*** -1.0083*** -1.0102***
MATURITYl 3m.-1y. (0/1) -0.3214*** -0.3237*** -0.3252***
MATURITYl 1y.-3y. (0/1) 0.0211*** 0.0263*** 0.0251***
GPDGt 1 0.8327*** 0.9013*** 0.9446***
GPDGt T 1 -9.4598*** -12.6153*** -12.5946***
TIME TREND -0.0061*** -0.0059*** -0.0058***
TIME TREND 2 -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
CONSTANT 2.7283*** 2.6832*** 2.6491***
ln() (duration dependence) 0.5696 0.5703 0.5703
Log pseudolikehood -609386 -609144 -609379
21